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Abstract: Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder’s research linking 
‘democratization, institutional strength, and war’ prescribes the construction of 
strong central government institutions prior to mass elections as a strategy for 
reducing the risks of international belligerency associated with democratization. 
Though widely lauded as a prescriptive text for democracy-promoting foreign 
policies, Mansfield and Snyder’s institutional analysis of the democratization – 
war linkage skews institutional strength measures in favour of the executive, 
sidelining the other arms of government. Drawing on Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010–2011 
internationalized post-election crisis which was largely perpetuated by excessive 
executive powers and limited legislative leverage, this paper quantitatively 
evaluates the specific effect state legislatures bear on the democratization – war 
linkage. The evaluations yield affirmative evidence for the postulated influence 
of state legislatures. Thus, whilst heeding Mansfield and Snyder’s call for 
strengthening state institutions, foreign policies promoting liberal democracy 
should ensure the ultimate institutional configuration of power in aspirant 
democracies favours parliaments over executives for more auspicious outcomes.  
 
Keywords: Democratization, Parliamentary Strength, International Belligerency 
 
Introduction 
Recent waves of democratic protests 
and autocratic repressions have 
triggered civil wars and threatened, or 
yielded, militarized interventions in 
Syria, Libya, and Côte d’Ivoire, 
revitalizing Mansfield and Snyder’s 
democratization and (intra/inter-state) 
war linkage. Mansfield and Snyder 
(1995a, 1995b, 1996) initially endorsed 
the democratic peace thesis that 
democracies almost never fight each 
other, but portrayed the path to 
democracy, democratization, as prone to 
diversionary war derailments by 
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threatened autocratic incumbents 
resisting democratic change.  
 
Reacting to criticisms either 
problematizing their research design 
(Enterline 1996; Thompson and Tucker 
1997a, 1997b) or exuding contrasting 
evidence that democratization averts 
violence (Wolf 1996; Ward and 
Gleditsch 1998, 2000), Mansfield and 
Snyder (2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 
2008, including Snyder 2000, 2004) 
refined their design and incorporated 
‘institutional strength’ as the source of 
variations in the war propensities of 
democratizing states: the stronger a 
democratizer’s governmental 
institutions, the greater its capacity to 
effectively manage increased popular 
participation in politics and to control 
elite rivalry in ways that mitigate risks 
of hostilities. The authors’ newer 
research finds incompletely 
democratizing states (transitioning from 
autocracy to mixed or anocratic 
regimes) to be more war-prone than 
complete democratizers (culminating in 
coherent democracy), principally 
because of the predominance of 
weak/incoherent democratic institutions 
in the former category.  
 
By policy implication, democracy-
building ‘should be accompanied by 
efforts to mould strong, centralized 
institutions’ (Mansfield and Snyder. 
2002 p.334). Renowned international 
relations scholars, including Samuel 
Huntington, Fareed Zakaria, Thomas 
Carothers, Joshua Cohen, Allan Stam 
and Cindy Skach, have explicitly 
endorsed Mansfield and Snyder’s latter 
work (2005a, back cover) as a foreign 
policy instructive text on peaceful 
democratization. Further popularizing 
the authors’ work is the publicity it has 
garnered from prominent international 
media such as the New York Times, 
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and 
National Public Radio (Narang and 
Nelson, 2009 p.358). 
Critically, however, Mansfield and 
Snyder’s research design 
overemphasizes the impact of the chief 
executive on foreign policy outcomes. 
Specifically, the authors derive 
measures of ‘institutional strength’ from 
an index, ‘DomConcentration’, which 
gauges the concentration of power in 
central governments. But almost all six 
component indices of the index focus on 
the executive, overlooking the other 
branches of government. This 
marginalization of the other arms of 
government is problematic at two levels: 
at the empirical level, it misses the 
influence or constraints the legislature 
and the judiciary might wield over 
executive foreign policy decision 
making; at the policy level, 
strengthening the executive without 
concurrent amplification of the other 
branches potentially has the danger of 
counterproductively inducing unchecked 
diversionary belligerency by powerful 
incumbents seeking to sustain political 
survival through rash foreign 
adventures. 
To contribute towards mitigating this 
marginalization, the armed conflict 
participations of democratizing states 
are herein articulated as fundamentally 
contingent, at least in part, on the 
strength of the legislature vis-à-vis the 
executive. Powerful parliaments can 
restrict the diversionary conflict 
proclivities of democratizing states by, 
for instance, refusing to fund military 
operations, or more extremely, by 
revising state laws to curb executive 
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military powers, including powers to 
wage wars. Empirical assessments over 
the immediate post-Cold War period of 
‘third wave’ democratization processes 
corroborate the postulated linkage 
between parliamentary strength and 
democratizer participations in inter-state 
conflicts. However, based on chi-square 
tests, no statistically significant 
association is found between levels of 
legislative leverage over the executive 
(weak or strong) and levels of 
democratic change (incomplete or 
complete) within belligerent 
democratizers. Hence, whilst heeding to 
Mansfield and Snyder’s call for strong 
central institutions to accompany 
democratization, foreign policies 
promoting democracy for peace need to 
ensure the institutional balance of power 
favours parliaments over executives, 
irrespective of transitional levels. 
 
Apart from its bearing on foreign policy, 
this study illuminates current empirical 
controversy on democratization, 
institutional strength, and inter-state 
belligerency. While Mansfield and 
Snyder (2002, 2005a, 2005b) depict 
incompletely democratizing states with 
weak institutions as more susceptible to 
wars than other regime-types, a recent 
re-evaluation by Narang and Nelson 
(2009) does not find corroborative 
evidence. Rather, the latter study finds 
‘a dearth of observations where 
incomplete democratizers with weak 
institutions participated in war’ (p. 357). 
Thus, it posits: ‘incomplete 
democratizers with weak institutions are 
no more likely to go to war than other 
types of states’ (p. 368). Spanning the 
1990s explicitly acknowledged by 
Mansfield and Snyder (2002 p. 297) as a 
‘decade of […] democratization’ but not 
covered by either pair of scholars on 
either side of the extant empirical 
divide, another re-evaluation (Che, 2014 
p. 3) finds only ‘feeble’ evidence in 
support of Mansfield and Snyder’s 
thesis.  
 
By turning attention to legislatures, 
away from extant focus on executives in 
measurements of institutional strength, 
and by focusing on militarized interstate 
disputes (MIDs) instead of full scale 
wars, this article ventilates the new 
empirical controversy on 
democratization and inter-state 
belligerency with fresh perspectives. 
Empirical evaluations herein evince 
national parliamentary strength 
differences as impactful on 
democratizers’ (non)involvement in 
MIDs. This exudes empirical support for 
Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis linking 
democratization, institutional strength, 
and war whilst undermining Narang and 
Nelson’s antithesis.  
 
Proceeding in three major parts, this 
paper starts off by reviewing Côte 
d’Ivoire’s recent internal and 
internationalized post-electoral 
militarized crisis as emblematic of the 
dangers of holding transitional elections 
without effective legislative protection 
of public courts and electoral 
commissions from executive 
manipulation. The review inspires and 
justifies broader cross-country analysis 
of the proposed relationship between 
legislative strength and democratizer 
belligerency. Concurrently, the review 
debunks received wisdom linking Côte 
d’Ivoire’s judiciary and electoral 
commission to the country’s 
international crisis as overly simplistic.  
 
Next, the paper postulates how the most 
powerful parliaments can exert 
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constraints on foreign policy decision 
making on military force usage by the 
chief executive. Through the theoretical 
outline, parliamentary strength is 
hypothesized as a key condition 
determining democratizing states’ 
participation or non-participation in 
armed diversionary international 
conflicts. It is also hypothesized and 
argued that parliamentary power does 
not correlate with degrees of democratic 
transition within democratizing 
belligerents.  
 
Finally, the article outlines its research 
design, and reports associated empirical 
results and their policy implication. 
Assessed against Che’s (2014) two test 
datasets generated from either side of 
Maoz’s (2008) dyadic MID database, 
with regime change measures simulating 
Mansfield and Snyder’s (2002), and 
with parliamentary power gauged from 
Henisz’s (2002) Political Constraints 
Index (POLCONIII), almost all 
democratizing MID participants (93.5%) 
over the immediate post-Cold War 
period of 1989 – 1999 exude weak or 
zero legislative leverage over executive 
discretion. But chi-square tests show no 
significant relationship between 
democratizers’ parliamentary power and 
coherency in democratic transition at a 
0.05 level of statistical significance. 
Thus, for more auspicious and less 
atrocious external outcomes, would-be 
democracies, irrespective of their 
location on the democratization journey, 
need to engineer substantial legislative 
sway over executive agencies. 
 
Conceptual Explication 
Prior to re-examining the institutional 
sources of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2011 post-
election crisis, a clarification of the key 
concepts and theoretical framework 
used in this article is in order. The key 
concepts are democratization, 
parliamentary strength, and international 
conflict. As commonly used in studies 
on the democratization – conflict nexus, 
democratization herein refers to a 
process of political reforms towards 
establishing a greater participatory role 
for the people, especially with regards to 
selecting the state’s legislative and chief 
executive officers. States in the process 
of democratization are also herein 
referred to as democratizers. The 
democratic reform process can either be 
‘complete’ or ‘incomplete’. A complete 
democratic transition is one where 
reforms culminate in a free and fair 
competitive electoral process through 
which the former chief executive is 
replaced or retained, with the newly 
elected authority being directly 
accountable to the entire electorate.  
 
However, for the transitional process to 
remain complete and sustained, the 
newly elected government would be 
expected to relinquish power peacefully 
should it lose a subsequent election. 
Elections without guarantees of political 
liberties leave the democratization 
process incomplete and at best illiberal. 
But where competitive elections fail to 
hold or fail to produce an elected 
government, the democratic transitional 
process is deemed to be even more 
incomplete.  
 
Throughout this article, except 
otherwise indicated, parliamentary 
strength/power specifically relates to the 
level of leverage or influence (weak or 
strong) exercised by the legislature over 
the executive arm of government. The 
third key concept, international 
belligerency, relates to threats, display, 
and/or actual use of military force by a 
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The Mansfield and Snyder studies 
linking democratization and 
international belligerency typically 
adopt rational choice thought, 
explaining the conflict propensity of 
democratizers as a function of a 
strategic political survival policy choice 
by autocratic chief executives threatened 
by democratic reforms. Seeking to ward 
off opposition and keep hold of power, 
the threatened incumbents embark on 
foreign diversionary altercations that 
would generate a ‘rally round the flag’ 
effect, shore up prestige, popular 
support, and ultimately enhance political 
survival at the helm (Mansfield and 
Snyder, 1995a p.33; 1995b  p.93). 
Critically, however, the rational choice 
theoretical framework overlooks or 
ignores the institutional influence state 
institutions, particularly the parliament, 
might possess over the chief executive 
with regards to foreign policy decision-
making. The potential relevance of the 
legislature to explaining the chief 
executive’s foreign policy decision-
making justifies the adoption of 
structural functionalism as the 
fundamental theoretical framework of 
this article. Structural functionalism 
suitably allows holistic analyses of the 
intimately linked nature of executive 
and legislative sources of democratizing 
states’ incentives for foreign 
belligerency.  
 
Reviewing the Institutional Sources  
of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2011 Post-election 
Crisis 
When Mansfield and Snyder (2002 p. 
334) first analysed the relevance of 
institutional strength to the 
democratization – war linkage, they 
concluded by explicitly advocating ‘the 
formation of impartial courts and 
election commissions’ as part of their 
prescription for averting the dangers of 
democratization. However, as with other 
specific normative institutional reform 
recommendations constituting their 
prescriptive package, the authors failed 
to argue the association implied between 
the judiciary, elections, and risks of 
violence. Building on Côte d’Ivoire’s 
2011 post-electoral crisis, a group of 
democratization and war scholars 
(Cederman et al. 2013) cleared the 
above gap with a large-N study linking 
elections and incentives for [ethnic] 
civil violence. Aligned with prevailing 
perceptions of Côte d’Ivoire’s recent 
crisis, Cederman et al. (2013 p.391) 
apparently accentuate the Ivorian 
Constitutional Council’s partiality – for 
then-incumbent state leader Laurent 
Gbagbo – as the institutional source of 
incentives for violence. This section 
reconstructs the Constitutional 
Council’s prejudice as a product of 
excessive executive power, presaged 
and facilitated by limited legislative 
leverage over the executive. The 
reconstruction substantiates the rationale 
for quantitative tests of the postulated 
linkage between parliamentary power 
and democratizer belligerency.  
 
Côte d’Ivoire’s Conflict-Plagued 
Democratization Process 
Prior to reviewing the institutional link 
between democratization and the recent 
crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, a regime 
characterization of that country as 
democratizing warrants explication. 
Upon gaining independence from 
colonial rule in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire, like 
several other sub-Saharan African 
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states, came under one-party 
dictatorship. Transition from that 
dictatorship to competitive multi-party 
democracy commenced with the 
organization of multi-party and multi-
candidate presidential elections in 1990. 
However, Côte d’Ivoire and sub-
Saharan Africa’s drive to democracy 
since the early 1990s is marked by 
‘profound flaws’, ‘rollbacks’ or 
‘setbacks’. Through the infamous 
exclusionary doctrine of ‘Ivoirite’, 
second generation economic immigrants 
such as current state president Alassane 
Ouattara, though born in Côte d’Ivoire, 
were systematically barred from 
contesting (and voting in) the 
presidential elections of 1995 and 2000. 
 Exclusionary politics of belonging 
metamorphosed to a protracted civil war 
in 2002, splitting the country between a 
rebel-held, mainly Muslim North and a 
government-controlled, chiefly 
Christian South. Peace negotiations 
resulting in the Linas-Macoussis (2003), 
Accra II and III (2003; 2004), Pretoria 
(2005) and Ouagadougou (2007) 
political agreements sought (at least in 
part) to broaden political participation 
and induce a more inclusive, 
competitive and comprehensive form of 
democracy in Côte d’Ivoire. Based on 
the peace agreements, Ouattara was 
permitted to run for presidential 
elections and a more inclusive electoral 
roll was compiled through a new 
citizenship identification process 
involving ‘audiences foraines’ (‘mobile 
court hearings).  
 
Designed to culminate transition – 
coded -88 (‘planned transition) on the 
Polity IV index – from exclusionary, 
belligerent and incoherent democratic 
politics to inclusive, peaceful and 
coherent democracy, preparations for 
post-war elections between 2007 and 
2009 failed to forestall violence in 2011 
following the presidential polls of 2010. 
Côte d’Ivoire relapsed to violence after 
incumbent Gbagbo, ‘with the help of the 
Constitutional Council (Cederman et al. 
2013, 391), obdurately refused to 
relinquish power despite the country’s 
Independent Electoral Commission 
(CEI) declaring Ouattara winner. 
International intervention by French and 
UN peacekeeping forces to defend the 
CEI’s UN-certified verdict and to 
protect civilians resulted in an 
international militarized dispute 
between the foreign forces and 
Gbagbo’s military. 
 
Admittedly, the Constitutional Council’s 
biased decision to overturn CEI’s 
verdict ensured violence outbreak in the 
absence of alternative neutral electoral 
dispute arbitration avenues. Critically, 
however, the Council’s bias was hardly 
an independent initiative of the 
judiciary. Rather, in hindsight, it was an 
inevitable consequence of legislative 
failures to curb excessive executive 
powers and ensure effective 
independence for CEI and the judiciary. 
Constitutionally, and presumably 
conscious of the normative governance 
principle of checks and balances, Côte 
d’Ivoire’s unicameral legislature (the 
National Assembly) shares powers of 
judicial appointments with the chief 
executive (see Ivorian 2000 
Constitution). The National Assembly 
has a role in the appointment of 
members of the Constitutional Council 
(art. 89), the Superior Council of the 
Magistrature (art. 105), and the High 
Court (art. 108). In practice, however, as 
noted in Fish and Kroenig’s (2009 
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pp.169 - 173) global survey of national 
legislatures, the National Assembly has 
limited powers (with a parliamentary 
power score of 0.38/1), and ‘does not 
play a part in judicial appointments’ (p. 
169). The National Assembly’s 
weakness, partially marked by its 
passivity in judicial appointments, 
leaves a leeway for unilateral 
presidential manipulation of the 
judiciary. Gbagbo exploited this leeway 
by stuffing the judiciary with staunch 
loyalists, orchestrating judicial 
prejudice. 
 
Accordingly, Gbagbo’s longstanding 
political ally, personal friend and 
academic colleague, Paul N’dre, whilst 
heading the Constitutional Council, 
ostensibly faced partisan pressure to 
nullify, and even overturn, CEI’s verdict 
without judicial verification of electoral 
malpractice allegations. After all, as 
noted by one New York Times Ivorian 
interviewee, when ‘you put your friend 
at the head of an institution, you know 
what the result is going to be’ (quoted 
by Nossiter 2010). Lack of legislative 
protection for CEI’s nominally 
exclusive powers to proclaim election 
results only served to ‘legitimise’ 
N’dre’s pro-Gbagbo partiality, mindful 
of the Constitutional Council’s 
constitutionally embedded (election 
results’) proclamation powers. 
Retrospectively, had Côte d’Ivoire’s 
legislature ensured exclusive 
proclamation powers for CEI, and had it 
insulated the judiciary from executive 
manipulation, it could have averted the 
country’s recent civil crisis and related 
international intervention. Côte 
d’Ivoire’s experience encapsulates the 
primacy of parliamentary power in 
institutional analysis of the conflict 
propensities of democratizing states.  
 
Parliamentary Checks on 
Democratizing Executives’ External 
Diversionary Incentives 
Parliamentary impact on (election-
related) civil conflict onset in 
transitional democracies is, as 
demonstrated by the above Ivorian case, 
dependent on legislative protection for 
autonomous judicial and electoral 
institutions. But, vis-à-vis diversionary 
international belligerency, there is 
presumably greater potential for a more 
direct parliamentary impact. This 
provides a stronger premise for 
empirical evaluations linking 
democratization, parliamentary power, 
and inter-state conflicts as opposed to 
evaluations focussed on intra-state 
conflicts. Prior to the empirical analysis, 
an outline of prominent parliamentary 
powers that permit direct leverage over 
democratizing executives’ external 
diversionary conflict decision-making is 
imperative.  
 
Six typical (but not universal) 
parliamentary powers potentially 
impacting executive external 
diversionary discretion immediately 
emerge, namely: i) powers to regulate 
appointments to top administrative 
positions, especially cabinet portfolios 
bearing on foreign relations and state 
defence management; ii) powers to 
interpellate and investigate executive 
officials; iii) powers to select and 
impeach the chief 
executive/commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces; iv) powers to (dis)approve 
proposed executive budgets and monitor 
executive spending; v) powers to 
declare wars and sanction executive 
calls for foreign military actions that do 
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not necessarily amount to full-scale 
wars; and most prominently vi) powers 
to enact and revise constitutional laws 
regulating all the above powers, though 
constitutional amendments may be 
subject to executive approval (as in 
Belarus, Cameroon, and Oman) or 
popular approval via referendums (as in 
Algeria, Guinea, and Paraguay)( Fish 
and Kroenig, 2009). 
 
These classical parliamentary powers 
are commonly acknowledged as 
veritable indicators of (parliamentary-
based) executive constraints in major 
datasets measuring such constraints 
(Henisz,2002, Marshall  and Jaggars, 
2002 pp.23-24; Fish and Kroenif, 2009). 
However, as noted earlier, the effect of 
parliamentary constraints (or the 
absence thereof) on diversionary-
motivated democratizing executives 
remains empirically unverified. To ease 
empirical analyses, it is dichotomously 
assumed here that strong parliaments 
(inducing strong executive constraints) 
can effectively stall or avert unpopular 
executive diversionary military 
expeditions and can ultimately hold 
venturesome executives accountable. In 
states undergoing democratic transition, 
strong parliaments imply curbed 
executive capacities to belligerently 
seek foreign policy victories and 
procure prestige to sustain political 
survival. Contrastingly, weak 
parliaments (inducing weak executive 
constraints) leave a leeway for unilateral 
executive externalisations whilst 
ensuring reckless state leaders can avoid 
public accountability. In transitional 
democracies, weak parliaments imply 
increased incentives for chief executives 
to boost leadership survival through 
diversionary militarized conflicts. Thus, 
it is hypothesized: 
 
Democratizing states with weak parliaments 
are more likely to engage in MIDs than 
democratizers with strong parliaments (H1). 
 
The counter hypothesis being: 
 
Democratizing states with weak parliaments 
are no more likely to engage in MIDs than 
democratizers with strong parliaments (H2). 
 
For deeper insight on the postulated 
impact of the legislature on 
democratization and inter-state conflict 
proclivity, it is worth investigating if 
levels of legislative leverage (weak or 
strong) and degrees of democratization 
(incomplete or complete) are positively 
associated – as presupposed in 
democratic peace, democratization and 
war, and democratization studies. By 
explaining the existence of a separate 
peace among democracies as a function 
– at least in part – of ‘institutional 
constraints’ (particularly including 
parliamentary accountability), some 
principal democratic peace proponents 
(Beuno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; 
Morgan and Schwebach 1992; and 
Russett 1995) in effect implicitly 
connect parliamentary capacity and 
pacific democracy. Critically, however, 
the institutional constraints’ explanatory 
model of the democratic peace cannot 
concurrently account for the hostility of 
democracies towards non-democracies 
both at the level of full-scale wars 
(Schwartz and Skinner, 2002) and 
militarized disputes (Wayman, 2002).  
 
Testament to democracies’ 
unconstrained militarized bellicosity 
outside the democratic peace zone: 
despite being one of the world’s oldest 
democracies and despite war declaration 
powers constitutionally residing in 
Congress, the US has since the end of 
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the Second World War initiated several 
militarized confrontations abroad 
(Waxman 2011). And it usually does so 
under unilateral presidential 
authorization, with congressional 
subservience that has culminated in 
consistent presidential dominance of 
war powers – even after the War Powers 
Resolution was passed in 1973 obliging 
presidential consultation with congress 
on substantial uses of military force 
abroad (Waxman 2011; McMahon 
2013). When Congress recently rebuffed 
president Obama’s solicitation for 
parliamentary authorization to bombard 
Syria and degrade capacities for further 
chemical weapons’ usage in that 
country’s drawn-out civil war, it became 
only the first time Congress had 
effectively impeded a president from 
initiating war (Weisbrot 2013). Previous 
‘presidential leeway’ in military force 
usage and recent parliamentary 
obstruction of proposed armed action 
against Syria suggest that evidence for 
the democratic peace linkage between 
democracy and parliamentary 
power/constraints over executive 
foreign relations’ management is, at 
best, in America’s supposedly mature 
democratic tradition, mixed.  
 
Presumptions of links between 
parliamentary power and degrees of 
democratization are more directly 
insinuated in Mansfield and Snyder’s 
latter work examining the relevance of 
political institutions to democratization 
and war. For Mansfield and Snyder 
(2002), incompletely democratizing 
states are more war-prone than 
completely democratizing ones on 
account of a prevalence of weak 
institutional constraints in the former 
category. Within the incipiently 
democratizing states, there is a ‘gap 
between high levels of political 
participation and weak political 
institutions’ (2002, 299). Given this 
institutional deficit, ‘none of the 
mechanisms that produce the democratic 
peace among mature democracies 
operate in the same fashion’ for 
incipient democratizers (2002, 301). In 
their empirical section, however, the 
authors admit to finding only a weak 
relationship between institutional 
strength (per DomConcentration index 
measures) and democratization 
(Mansfield and Synder,2002 p.316)  
 
In his ‘Stronger Legislatures, Stronger 
Democracies’, Fish (2006, p. 5) finds 
evidence revealing ‘the presence of a 
powerful legislature [as] an unmixed 
blessing for democratization’. But that 
evidence is restricted to only one 
geopolitical region – the postcommunist 
world (p. 7). And there are major flaws 
with the Fish-Kroenig Parliamentary 
Powers Index (hereafter, PPI) from 
which Fish measures the strength of 
national legislatures.(Fish, 2006; 
Kroenig,209). It is overly aggregative, 
with component indicators covering up 
to 32 items, only nine of which 
specifically captures sway over the 
executive – the component survey 
category most impactful on executive 
foreign policy decision-making. 
 
Calculations of aggregate PPI scores 
attach equal value to all 32 survey items, 
irrespective of survey categories. This 
problematically implies that a legislature 
with more ‘check marks’ under 
institutional resources (covering items 
like number of parliamentary sessions, 
personal secretaries and non-secretarial 
staff) than under institutional sway 
(incorporating items as powers to 
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monitor, interpellate, investigate and 
impeach/replace executive officials) is 
rated equally powerful as another 
legislature with reversed numbers of 
affirmative indicators under the distinct 
survey categories.  
 
What is more, PPI scores are stationary 
across time, problematically implying 
insensitivity to: i) any possible 
occasional or regular constitutional 
changes to the institutional distribution 
of state powers, which could amplify or 
attenuate powers of the legislature; and 
ii) levels of alignment in policy 
preferences across the branches of 
government, which could minimize or 
maximize parliamentary motivations for 
constraining executive leadership.  
 
Weaknesses underlying Fish’s research 
design undermine his evidence linking 
parliamentary strength and degrees of 
democratization. Even if accepted 
accurate, the evidence derives more 
from aggregate measures of 
parliamentary powers and less from 
specific evaluations of legislative 
leverage over executive [foreign policy] 
discretion, especially within the context 
of democratization and diversionary war 
theory. Stretching the above lines of 
thought (and evidence) suggesting a 
positive association between 
parliamentary strength and degrees of 
democratization, it could be 
hypothesized here that: 
 
[Weak/strong] levels of parliamentary 
power in MID-participating democratizers 
positively relate to [incomplete/complete] 
levels of democratization (H3). 
But weaknesses in extant 
presuppositions of an association 
between parliamentary strength and 
extent of democratization perhaps point 
to a counterfactual hypothesis of 
statistical independence, that: 
 
There is no statistically significant 
relationship between parliamentary power 
and degrees of democratization in MID-
participating democratizers (H4). 
 
Research Design 
To assess the asserted link between 
democratization, parliamentary strength, 
and participation in MIDs, I employed 
two test datasets assembled and used by 
Che (2014) to evaluate Mansfield and 
Snyder’s newer thesis. The datasets: i) 
cover the immediate post-Cold War 
period (1989 – 1999) of ‘third wave’ 
democratization processes which is 
largely excluded from mainstream 
democratization and war statistical 
studies (Che 2014, p. 2); ii) measure 
regime change from Polity IV, with 
coding instructions modelled on 
Mansfield and Snyder’s (2002 p.313; 
2005a p. 79) criteria, but measurement 
intervals are ‘flexible’ (rather than 
‘fixed’) five-year periods preceding 
each MID within the decade under 
study; and iii) separately capture the 
number of democratizers participating 
on either side (54 on SIDEA and 57 on 
SIDEB) of Maoz’s (2008) dyadic MID 
database for the decade under scrutiny 
(Che, 2014 pp.3-5) 
 
Adding to the above-mentioned test 
datasets, parliamentary strength – that 
is, the extent of executive constraints 
induced by the national legislature 
(EXCON) – was gauged for 
democratizers on both sides (EXCONA 
and EXCONB) of Maoz’s database. 
EXCON entries were derived from 
Henisz’s (2002) Political Constraints 
Index (POLCONIII) measuring the 
capacity of state governmental 
institutions (specifically the legislature 
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and the executive) to inhibit or influence 
changes in government policies. Using a 
simple spatial model of political 
interaction, POLCONIII rates legislative 
constraints on the executive as minimal 
or absent (scoring 0) in the absence of a 
legislature. Each additional legislative 
institution (chamber) controlled by a 
political party different from the one(s) 
controlling other branches of 
government has a positive but 
diminishing effect on the total level of 
constraints on executive capacity to alter 
government policy (Mansfield and 
Snyder 1995a, 33; 1995b, 93). 
POLCONIII yields a maximum score 
(1) where policy preferences within the 
legislature are homogenous but 
diametrically opposed to those of the 
executive. 
 
By incorporating (intra- and inter-) 
institutional configurations of policy 
preferences in its index calculations, 
POLCONIII, unlike the PPI index, 
plausibly exudes sensitivity to a major 
potential source of temporal variations 
in legislative leverage. Testament to 
this, POLCONIII scores are temporally 
fluid (available for every year between 
1800 and 2001), not absolute or fixed. A 
further advantage of POLCONIII over 
PPI for this study is that it specifically 
gauges parliamentary power in terms of 
constraints over executive discretion, 
including diversionary discretion as 
relates to democratizing executives. Put 
differently, POLCONIII is not guilty of 
the overly aggregative nature of PPI.  
But POLCONIII is not without 
weaknesses. Most evidently, it uses 
political identity (party affiliation) as the 
sole source of (institutional) legislative 
policy preferences. This disregards the 
relevance of other potential preference 
determinants such as education, religion, 
gender and wealth, which may not 
necessarily coincide with party 
cleavages, particularly vis-à-vis debates 
on aggressive foreign policies. Even if 
policy preferences were exclusively 
based on party identities, there would 
yet be the challenge of discerning 
majoritarian preferences for extremely 
fragmented multiparty parliaments 
wherein ruling majorities might not be 
singular   parties but coalitions with 
diverse preferences. Credibly, however, 
in the absence of data on party 
fractionalization (within ruling 
majorities), Henisz (2002) addresses 
fractionalization problems loosely at the 
parliamentary level as against the party 
coalitional level, treating the former as 
an ‘imperfect proxy’ for the latter. 
A transformation of POLCONIII’s 
continuous scale of 0 to 1 into 
dichotomous categories of ‘either strong 
or weak’ was imperative for appropriate 
empirical verification of hypotheses H1 
and H3, relative to H2 and H4. 
Accordingly, I classified legislatures in 
belligerent democratizers as ‘strong’, 
coded 1, if they evince POLCONIII 
scores greater than or equal to 0.50 
(strong ≥ 0.50). By contrast, legislatures 
in MID-participating democratizers 
were considered ‘weak’, coded 0, if they 
yield POLCONIII scores less than 0.50 
(weak < 0.50). Compared to Fish’s 
(2006, 12) threshold of 0.60 for 
powerful parliaments (on the PPI index) 
in his ‘stronger legislatures, stronger 
democracies’ study, a threshold of 0.50 
on POLCONIII is slightly less stringent.  
Computational frequency counts on the 
statistical package for social sciences 
(SPSS, version 20) generated the 
following frequency distributions of 
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MID-participating democratizers per 




Table 1: Frequency distribution (by parliamentary strength) of belligerent democratizers on one 
side (SIDEA) of Maoz’s (2008) MID data for the period 1989 and 1999 
executive constraints 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0 Weak 48 88.9 90.6 90.6 
1 Strong 5 9.3 9.4 100.0 
Total 53 98.1 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.9   
Total 54 100.0   
 
 
Table 2: Frequency distribution (by parliamentary strength) of belligerent democratizers  
on the other side (SIDEB) of Maoz’s (2008) MID data for the period 1989 and 1999 
 
executive constraints 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
0 Weak 54 94.7 96.4 96.4 
1 Strong 2 3.5 3.6 100.0 
Total 56 98.2 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.8   
Total   57 100.0   
 
 
The frequency tables exude strong 
supportive evidence for H1, relative to 
H2. Despite a relaxed threshold for 
parliamentary strength, over 90% of 
belligerent democratizers on either side 
of Maoz’s data reveal weak legislative 
leverage. Two belligerent democratizer 
cases (Ethiopia in 1994, on SIDEA and 
Estonia in 1992, on SIDEB) are not 
coded in POLCONIII and thus appear as 
the lone cases with missing data in 
tables 1 and 2 Based on the number 
cases effectively counted on SIDEA and 
SIDEB combined, belligerent 
democratizers with weak parliaments 
(90.6% + 96.4% / 2 = 93.5%) constitute 
over 14 times the number of belligerent 
democratizers with powerful 
parliaments (6.5%). The number of 
democratizers with weak parliaments on 
SIDEB is roughly proportionate to that 
of SIDEA. In fact, a chi-square test for 
goodness-of-fit on SIDEB, with relevant 
test proportion values derived from 
SIDEA (90.6%: 9.4% or 0.91: 0.09), 
shows close proximity between 
expected and observed values as 
reported below: 
   12 
 
 
Table 3: Output for goodness-of-fit chi-square test comparing frequency distributions on SIDEB 
to those on SIDEA 
 
executive constraints 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
0 Weak 54 50.7 3.3 
1 Strong 2 5.3 -3.3 








Asymp. Sig. .135 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected 
frequencies less than 5. The minimum 
expected cell frequency is 5.3. 
 
According to the one-sample chi-
square output, the discrepancy 
between the expected N and 
observed N values is minute and not 
statistically significant (Asymp. Sig. 
= 0.13 > 0.05). Put more explicitly, 
there is no significant difference in 
the proportion of democratizing 
states with weak legislatures on 
SIDEB relative to that on SIDEA, χ2 
(1, n = 56) = 2.23, p < 0.13. 
 
To empirically verify H3 and H4, 
chi-square tests for relatedness 
between levels of legislative 
leverage (over the executive) and 
degrees of democratization in 
belligerent democratizers are 
computationally conducted using the 
‘crosstabs’ procedure on SPSS. The 
procedure typically generates a 
contingency table containing joint 
frequency observations of the two 
categorical variables under analysis. 
Also, it calculates frequencies that 
would be expected assuming the null 
hypothesis of statistical 
independence. Expected frequencies 
are then compared with actually 
observed frequencies. The smaller 
the deviation of observed 
frequencies from expected ones, the 
greater the likelihood of non-
association between the variables. 
Executing the described chi-square 
procedure on SIDEA and SIDEB, 
the null hypothesis (H4) is confirmed 
for both sets of analysis while the 
alternative (H3) is rejected at the 
standard 0.05 alpha value of 
statistical significance. Thus, there is 
no statistically significant 
relationship between levels of 
legislative leverage and degrees of 
democratization in MID-involved 
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comprehensively, the crosstabs 
output are as follows: 
 
 
Table 4: Observed frequencies of all possible combinations between parliamentary strength and 
degrees of democratization for MID-involved democratizers on one side (SIDEA) of Maoz’s 
(2008) dyadic MID data set, 1989 – 1999 
 
incomplete democratizer? * executive constraints Crosstabulation 
 executive constraints Total 
0 Weak 1 Strong  
                                               incomplete  
                                              democratizer? 
                0 No (complete) 
Count 18 3 21 
% within incomplete 
democratizer? 
85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 
% within executive 
constraints 
37.5% 60.0% 39.6% 
% of Total 34.0% 5.7% 39.6% 
            1 Yes (incomplete) 
Count 30 2 32 
% within incomplete 
democratizer? 
93.8% 6.2% 100.0% 
% within executive 
constraints 
62.5% 40.0% 60.4% 
% of Total 56.6% 3.8% 60.4% 
                                                       Total 
Count 48 5 53 
% within incomplete 
democratizer? 
90.6% 9.4% 100.0% 
% within executive 
constraints 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 5: Chi-Square tests for relatedness between parliamentary power and  
degree of democratic change in belligerent democratizers on SIDEA 
 
Chi-Square Tests 






Pearson Chi-Square .958a 1 .328   
Continuity Correctionb .249 1 .618   
Likelihood Ratio .934 1 .334   
Fisher's Exact Test    .374 .304 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.940 1 .332 
  
N of Valid Cases 53     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.98. 





Table 6: Degree of relatedness/independence between parliamentary power and  
democratic transition on SIDEA 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi -.134 .328 
Cramer's V .134 .328 
N of Valid Cases 53  
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 














    15 
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Table 7: Observed frequencies of all possible combinations between parliamentary strength and 
degrees of democratization for MID-involved democratizers on the opposite side (SIDEB) of 
Maoz’s (2008) dyadic MID data set, 1989 – 1999 
 








































 executive constraints Total 
0 Weak 1 Strong  
incomplete  
democratizer? 
0 No (complete) 
Count 20 2 22 
% within incomplete 
democratizer? 
90.9% 9.1% 100.0% 
% within executive 
constraints 
37.0% 100.0% 39.3% 
% of Total 35.7% 3.6% 39.3% 
1 Yes (incomplete) 
Count 34 0 34 
% within incomplete 
democratizer? 
100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within executive 
constraints 
63.0% 0.0% 60.7% 
% of Total 60.7% 0.0% 60.7% 
 Total 
Count 54 2 56 
% within incomplete 
democratizer? 
96.4% 3.6% 100.0% 
% within executive 
constraints 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 96.4% 3.6% 100.0% 
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Table 8: Chi-Square tests for relatedness between parliamentary power and  
degree of democratic change in belligerent democratizers on SIDEB 
 
Chi-Square Tests 






Pearson Chi-Square 3.205a 1 .073   
Continuity Correctionb 1.109 1 .292   
Likelihood Ratio 3.853 1 .050   
Fisher's Exact Test    .150 .150 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.148 1 .076   
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .79. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Table 9: Degree of relatedness/independence between parliamentary power  
and democratic transition on SIDEA 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 
Phi -.239 .073 
Cramer's V .239 .073 
N of Valid Cases 56  
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 




Joint frequency observations reveal 
incompletely democratizing disputants 
with weak national legislatures (30 of 53 
on SIDEA, table 4; 34 of 56 on SIDEB, 
table 7) as the most belligerent of the 
different variable combinations. 
However, per chi-square tests reported 
in tables 5 and 8, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between 
parliamentary strength and 
democratization quality within the 
conflictual democratizers under 
analysis. As the minimum expected 
frequency for each cell in the frequency 
distribution on both SIDEA and SIDEB 
is less than 5 (see note ‘a’ beneath tables 
5 and 8), a fundamental precondition for 
Pearson chi-square tests is violated for 
both data samples (Pallant 2010, 219).  
 
Consistent with Pallant’s (2010, 217) 
recommendation, to remedy this 
violation of the minimum expected 
frequency condition, Fisher’s Exact 
Probability Test is more appropriate for 
evaluating the statistical significance of 
chi-square outputs here. Fisher’s (2-
sided and 1-sided) Exact Test values for 
chi-square tests on both SIDEA and 
SIDEB largely surpass the standard 0.05 
alpha value of statistical significance,  
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lending support to the null hypothesis 
(H4). Evaluating the extent of 
independence in the effects of 
parliamentary power and degrees of 
democratization, Phi correlation 
coefficients (-.134 on SIDEA, table 6; -
.239 on SIDEB, table 9) portray 
extremely marginal joint effects, based 
on a criteria of 0.10 for small effect, 
0.30 for medium effect, and 0.50 for 




Mansfield and Snyder’s institutional 
analysis of democratization and war 
clearly depict democratizers with weak 
institutions as more war-prone than 
those with strong institutions. But the 
authors’ research design gauge 
institutional strength mainly from the 
degree of power concentration in the 
executive branch government, 
marginalising the other branches. 
Drawing on Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict-
ridden democratization experience – 
where excessive executive power and 
limited legislative leverage culminated 
in internal and international conflicts – 
this essay has articulated legislative 
constraints on the executive 
(parliamentary power) as a major check 
against democratizers’ diversionary 
propensities. Empirical evaluations 
affirm the asserted impact of national 
legislatures. According to frequency 
observations focussed on i) the 
immediate post-Cold War period of 
‘third wave’ democratic transitions not 
covered in the Mansfield and Snyder 
data, and ii) MIDs as against full-scale 
wars, almost all democratizer disputants 
(93.5%) exuded weak legislative  
 
 
leverage (scoring less than 0.50 on 
POLCONIII) over executive discretion. 
 
From a policy viewpoint, the 
observations potentially imply that: 
when strengthening state institutions to 
attenuate conflict propensity during 
democratization, the ultimate 
institutional configuration of power 
should guarantee substantial legislative 
sway over the executive. Subjugating 
executive powers to parliamentary 
oversight in aspirant and transitional 
democracies could be an effective 
mechanism for deflating diversionary 
conflict incentives and for extracting 
leadership accountability on military 
force usage. Through constitutional and 
institutional reforms that engender and 
safeguard extensive legislative leverage 
over chief executives in democratizing 
states, the masses are empowered to 
impact foreign policy through their 
parliamentary representatives, and thus 
can avert venturesome diversionary 
externalizations. The advocated 
empowerment of weak parliaments 
should be pursued irrespective of the 
volume of democratic reforms already 
initiated within the concerned aspiring 
or emerging democracies. This policy 
implication arises from the absence of 
any statically significant association – in 
the pair of chi-square tests (for 
relatedness) – between parliamentary 
power and degrees of democratization in 
Maoz’s (2008) MID-involved 
democratizers.  
 
Building strong state institutions (as 
recommended by Mansfield and Snyder) 
might be a sound strategy for mitigating 
the dangers of democratization. But 
failing to configure the final institutional 
balance of power to favour parliaments 
(as articulated herein), might undermine 
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vertical and horizontal accountability, 
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